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WHERE IS FELIX COHEN WHEN WE NEED
HIM?: TRANSCENDENTAL NONSENSE AND
THE MORAL RESPONSIBILITY OF
CORPORATIONS
John Hasnas*
INTRODUCTION
Felix Cohen began Transcendental Nonsense and the
Functional Approach,1 perhaps the most entertaining law review
article ever written, by describing a heaven of legal concepts in
which could be found “all the logical instruments needed to
manipulate and transform . . . legal concepts and thus to create and
to solve the most beautiful of legal problems.”2 This heaven, which
contained
a dialectic-hydraulic-interpretation press, which could press
*
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publication. The author also wishes to thank Ann C. Tunstall of SciLucent, LLC
for her insightful comments on a draft of this article, and Annette and Ava
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first hand experience with transcendental nonsense. Portions of this Article were
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and with citations to the author and to the Journal of Law and Policy; however,
no derivatives may be made of this Article.
1
Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach,
35 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935).
2
Id. at 809.
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an indefinite number of meanings out of any text or statute,
an apparatus for constructing fictions, and a hair-splitting
machine that could divide a single hair into 999,999 equal
parts and, when operated by the most expert jurists, could
split each of these parts again into 999,999 equal parts . . .
[was] open to all properly qualified jurists, provided only
they drank the Lethean draught which induced
forgetfulness of terrestrial human affairs.3
This was the realm of transcendental nonsense in which legal
questions were resolved by examining the relationships among
abstract concepts divorced from any consideration of the practical
consequences or ethical quality of the decision.
As his first illustration of transcendental nonsense, Cohen
selected the law’s treatment of corporations. He pointed out that in
deciding whether a corporation incorporated in one state could be
sued in the courts of another, one might expect courts to make
“some factual inquiry into the practice of modern corporations in
choosing their sovereigns and into the actual significance of the
relationship between a corporation and the state of its
incorporation,”4 to consider “the difficulties that injured plaintiffs
may encounter if they have to bring suit against corporate
defendants in the state of incorporation . . . [and] the possible
hardship to corporations of having to defend actions in many
states, considering the legal facilities available to corporate
defendants,”5 and to decide the case “[o]n the basis of facts
revealed by such an inquiry, and on the basis of certain political or
ethical value judgments as to the propriety of putting financial
burdens upon corporations . . . .”6 Yet, when the New York Court
of Appeals was called upon to rule on this matter, “[i]nstead of
addressing itself to such economic, sociological, political, or
ethical questions . . . , the court addressed itself to the question,
‘Where is a corporation?’ Was this corporation really in
Pennsylvania or in New York, or could it be in two places at

3
4
5
6

Id.
Id. at 810.
Id.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
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once?”7
But how is such a question to be answered? As Cohen pointed
out,
Clearly the question of where a corporation is, when it
incorporates in one state and has agents transacting
corporate business in another state, is not a question that
can be answered by empirical observation. Nor is it a
question that demands for its solution any analysis of
political considerations or social ideals. It is, in fact, a
question identical in metaphysical status with the question
which scholastic theologians are supposed to have argued
at great length, “How many angels can stand on the point of
a needle?”8
Nevertheless, the court ruled that the corporation could be sued in
New York because by maintaining an office there, the corporation
had come into the state.9 The problem with this ruling is that
[n]obody has ever seen a corporation. What right have we
to believe in corporations if we don’t believe in angels? To
be sure, some of us have seen corporate funds, corporate
transactions, etc. . . . But this does not give us the right to
hypostatize, to “thingify,” the corporation, and to assume
that it travels about from State to State as mortal men
travel. Surely we are qualifying as inmates of . . . [the]
heaven of legal concepts when we approach a legal
problem in these essentially supernatural terms.10
Deciding cases by reifying the abstract concept of the corporation
is a classic example of transcendental nonsense.
Cohen warned us against settling controversial legal questions
on the basis of transcendental nonsense seventy-five years ago. In
this Article, I argue that his warning is still timely, and is equally
applicable to moral controversies—specifically, to the question of
whether corporations can and should be held morally responsible
for the actions of their agents. In Parts I and II, I review the
philosophical literature on this question and suggest that it shares
7

Id. (emphasis omitted).
Id. (emphasis omitted).
9
Id. at 811.
10
Id.
8
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many features of the transcendental decision-making that Cohen
decried. In Part III, I apply a more practically-oriented method of
analysis to the question—what Cohen might call the “functional
approach”11—and suggest that attributing moral responsibility to
corporations as collective entities is either without practical
significance or ethically pernicious.
I. THE PHILOSOPHICAL TREATMENT OF THE MORAL RESPONSIBILITY
OF CORPORATIONS
How do philosophers attempt to determine whether it makes
sense to ascribe moral responsibility to corporations? Most begin
by asking straightforwardly whether a corporation is the type of
thing that can bear moral responsibility.12 This question launches a
quest to compile a list of the characteristics something must
possess to be a moral agent. Once the list has been populated, the
nature of the corporation is examined to determine whether
corporations possess each of the necessary characteristics. If they
do, philosophers conclude that corporations are subject to moral
blame (or praise) for their actions;13 if they do not, the contrary
11

See infra Part III for a discussion of the “functional approach.”
See, e.g., THOMAS DONALDSON, CORPORATIONS AND MORALITY ch. 2
(1982); PATRICIA H. WERHANE, PERSONS, RIGHTS, AND CORPORATIONS ch. 2
(1985); David Copp, Collective Actions and Secondary Actions, 16 AM. PHIL. Q.
177 (1979); Peter A. French, The Corporation as a Moral Person, 16 AM. PHIL.
Q. 207 (1979) [hereinafter French, Corporation as a Moral Person]; Kenneth E.
Goodpaster & John B. Mathews, Jr., Can a Corporation Have a Conscience? 60
HARV. BUS. REV. 132 (1982); Virginia Held, Can a Random Collection of
Individuals Be Morally Responsible?, 67 J. PHIL. 471 (1970); Michael Keeley,
Organizations as Non-persons, 15 J. VALUE INQUIRY 149 (1979); John Ladd,
Morality and the Ideal of Rationality in Formal Organizations, 54 MONIST 488
(1970) [hereinafter Ladd, Morality]; Larry May, Vicarious Agency and
Corporate Responsibility, 43 PHIL. STUD. 69 (1983); David T. Ozar, The Moral
Responsibility of Corporations, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN BUSINESS. 294 (Thomas
Donaldson & Patricia H. Werhane eds., 1st ed. 1979); Philip Pettit,
Responsibility Incorporated, 117 ETHICS 171 (2007); Michael J. Phillips,
Corporate Moral Personhood and Three Conceptions of the Corporation, 2
BUS. ETHICS Q. 435, 453 (1992); Manuel Velasquez, Debunking Corporate
Moral Responsibility, 13 BUS. ETHICS Q. 531 (2003) [hereinafter Velasquez,
Debunking Corporate].
13
See, e.g., DONALDSON, supra note 12; WERHANE, supra note 12; French,
12
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conclusion is drawn.14
The seminal work in this regard is Peter French’s The
Corporation as a Moral Person.15 There, French identified two
necessary conditions for moral responsibility: (1) causation—that a
subject be capable of acting so as to be the cause of an event—and
(2) intentionality—that “the action in question was intended by the
subject or that the event was the direct result of an intentional act
of the subject.”16 French then argued that because all corporations
have institutional decision-making procedures—what he labeled
corporate internal decision (CID) structures17—corporations can
both cause events and act intentionally. These CID structures
“accomplish[] a subordination and synthesis of the intentions and
acts of various biological persons into a corporate decision.”18
Thus, “[a] functioning CID Structure incorporates acts of
biological persons.”19 When a corporation takes an action pursuant
to its CID structure, “it is proper to describe it as having been done
for corporate reasons, as having been caused by a corporate desire
coupled with a corporate belief and so, in other words, as corporate
intentional.”20 For French, this was sufficient to show not only that
corporations are proper subjects of moral responsibility, but also
that they are “full-fledged moral persons and have whatever
privileges, rights and duties as are, in the normal course of affairs,
accorded to moral persons.”21
French’s argument was immediately attacked on the grounds
Corporation as a Moral Person, supra note 12, Goodpaster & Mathews, supra
note 12; Ozar, supra note 12; Pettit, supra note 12; Phillips, supra note 12.
14
See, e.g., Keeley, supra note 12; Ladd, Morality, supra note 12; May,
supra note 12; Velasquez, Debunking Corporate, supra note 12.
15
French, Corporation as a Moral Person, supra note 12.
16
Id. at 211.
17
Id.
18
Id. at 212.
19
Id.
20
Id. at 213.
21
Id. at 207. David Ozar advanced a similar argument in favor of corporate
moral responsibility. Ozar too claimed that the formal and informal rules of the
organization “determine that some activities associated with the group are to
count as actions of the group as a single entity.” Ozar, supra note 12, at 296.
Because groups can therefore act in their own right, Ozar concluded that they
may be held morally responsible for such actions. Id. at 297.
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that its premises were too weak to establish its conclusion—
specifically, that being an intentional causal agent is not sufficient
for moral personhood. For example, Thomas Donaldson pointed
out that both a cat about to attack a mouse and a computer
alphabetizing a list of names can be said to act intentionally, yet
neither thereby qualifies as a moral person.22 Patricia Werhane
similarly argued that French’s argument could not establish
corporate moral personhood because “although [corporations]
indeed have some of the characteristics of persons, they lack the
autonomy necessary to perform primary actions, one of the
conditions necessary to be ascribed full personhood.”23 In addition,
Donaldson contended that there were good reasons to believe that
corporations cannot be moral persons. As French recognized, his
argument implied that corporations “have whatever privileges,
rights and duties as are, in the normal course of affairs, accorded to
moral persons.”24 But Donaldson claimed that this is either
undesirable—do we really want corporations to have the right to
vote?—or impossible—what could it mean to say that corporations
have the right to worship as they please or to pursue happiness?25
Despite their criticism of French’s argument on this ground,
both Donaldson and Werhane argued that corporations can be held
morally responsible. This is because full moral personhood is not
necessary for moral responsibility—although all moral persons are
morally responsible, subjects that do not satisfy all the
requirements of moral personhood can nevertheless be morally
responsible agents. To demonstrate this, both Donaldson and
Werhane supplied their own set of necessary conditions for moral
agency. According to Donaldson, to qualify as a moral agent, a
corporation need only “embody a process of moral decisionmaking.”26 This gives rise to two necessary conditions: (1) “[t]he
capacity to use moral reasons in decision-making,” and (2) “[t]he
capacity of the decision-making process to control not only overt

22
23
24
25
26

See DONALDSON, supra note 12, at 22.
WERHANE, supra note 12, at 57.
French, Corporation as a Moral Person, supra note 12, at 207.
See DONALDSON, supra note 12, at 22–23.
Id. at 30.
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corporate acts, but also the structure of policies and rules.”27
Donaldson claimed that many, if not most, corporations meet
these two requirements. While admitting that corporations “are
unable to think as humans,” he argued that corporations can be
morally accountable in the sense that “with the proper internal
structure, corporations, like humans, can be liable to give an
account of their behavior where the account stipulates which moral
reasons prompted their behavior.”28 Further, there is no reason
why a corporation’s internal decision procedures cannot be applied
self-referentially so that it is the corporation itself that controls the
creation and “maintenance of the corporation’s decision-making
machinery.”29 Hence, although not moral persons, corporations can
nevertheless be morally responsible agents.
Werhane suggested a different set of necessary conditions for
moral agency: (1) the capacity to act, and (2) the ability to form
intentions.30 Werhane contended that corporations have the
capacity to act because they can undertake secondary actions—
actions taken by individual corporate agents who are authorized to
act on behalf of the corporation by the corporate charter and bylaws as interpreted and amended by the board of directors,
corporate management, and market forces.31 These are true
corporate actions because they “cannot be redescribed in terms of
the actions of constituents.”32 Further, Werhane agreed with
French that the corporate structure incorporates the intentions of
individual human beings. Thus,
a corporate intentional system combines the sum of the
decision-making procedures carried out by boards of
directors, stockholders at annual meetings, management,
foremen, and other employees, with the advice of outside
agents such as lawyers, accountants, and public relations
persons, which together form collective “corporate”
“intentions” that are exhibited in “corporate decision27
28
29
30
31
32

Id.
Id.
Id.
WERHANE, supra note 12, at 57–59.
Id. at 52–56.
Id. at 56.
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making,” corporate “action,” and organizational goals.33
Thus, although corporations are not moral persons, they, “like
persons, are and should be, held morally responsible for actions
within their control . . . .”34
French himself was sufficiently influenced by objections such
as Donaldson’s and Werhane’s to abandon his claim that
corporations were moral persons.35 In his subsequent work, French
tempered his position by recognizing that to be morally
responsible, one need only be a moral “actor.”36 Then, in keeping
with the usual philosophical approach, he proposed a set of
necessary conditions an entity must satisfy to be a moral actor.
These are: (1) “the ability to act intentionally,”—i.e., have
“purposes, plans, goals, and interests that motivate some of its
behavior”;37 (2) “the ability to make rational decisions and to
consider rational arguments regarding their intentions”;38 and (3)
“the facility to respond to events and ethical criticism by altering
intentions and patterns of behavior that are harmful (or offensive)
to others or detrimental to their own interests.”39 French then
adapted his earlier argument to show that because corporations
possessed CID structures, they satisfied each of these conditions.40
Another example of the conventional approach to the question
of corporate moral responsibility is supplied by Philip Pettit. In his
article, Responsibility Incorporated,41 Pettit supplies three
necessary conditions for moral responsibility: (1) value
relevance—the subject “is an autonomous agent and faces a value
relevant choice involving the possibility of doing something good
or bad or right or wrong”;42 (2) value judgment—the subject “has
33

Id.
Id. at 59.
35
See PETER A. FRENCH, CORPORATE ETHICS 10 (1995).
36
See id.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 12.
39
Id.
40
Id. at 15 (“It is the corporation’s CID structure that allows it to be an
independent rational actor on the social scene, and that converts various human
behaviors and actions into corporate intentional action.”).
41
See generally Pettit, supra note 12.
42
Id. at 175.
34

Where Is Felix Cohen When We Need Him?

63

the understanding and access to evidence required for being able to
make judgments about the relative value of such options”;43 and
(3) value sensitivity—the subject “has the control necessary for
being able to choose between options on the basis of judgments
about their value.”44
Pettit argues that corporations satisfy the first condition
because they can (1) qualify as agents, and (2) act autonomously.
Corporations qualify as agents “when members act on the shared
intention that together they should realize the conditions that
ensure agency,”45 which they do by acting in accordance with a
constitution “whereby the members of a group might each be
assigned roles in the generation of an action-suited body of desire
and belief and in the performance of the actions that it supports.”46
Further, corporations can act autonomously because the
corporation’s judgment cannot be reduced to the judgment of the
individuals who comprise it. Thus, “[a]utonomy is intuitively
guaranteed by the fact that on one or more issues the judgment of
the group will have to be functionally independent of the
corresponding member judgments, so that its intentional attitudes
as a whole are most saliently unified by being, precisely, the
attitudes of the group.”47
Pettit claims that corporations satisfy the second and third
conditions as well. They can form value judgments “over a certain
proposition when the proposition is presented for consideration and
the group takes whatever steps are prescribed in the constitution
for endorsing it.”48 Thus, they are “able to form a judgment over
any proposition that members are capable of presenting for
consideration and of adjudicating by means of a vote or something
of the kind.”49 Further, they are value sensitive because they
may control in a reason-sensitive way for the performance
of a certain action by some members, maybe these or
43
44
45
46
47
48
49

Id.
Id.
Id. at 179.
Id.
Id. at 184.
Id. at 186.
Id. at 187.
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maybe those. [They] will do this, by maintaining a
constitution for the formation and enactment of [their]
attitudes, arranging things so that some individual or
individuals are identified as the agents to perform a
required task, and other individuals are identified as agents
to ensure that should the performers fail, there will be
others to take their place as backups.50
Once the philosophical advocates of corporate moral
responsibility have identified the necessary conditions for moral
responsibility, the debate shifts to whether corporations can satisfy
them. Critics argue that they cannot. For example, Manuel
Velasquez attacked French’s initial causation requirement on the
ground that corporations lack the ability to act. He argued that
moral responsibility for an act . . . can be attributed only to
that agent who originated the act in his own body, that is, in
the movements of a body over which he has direct control.
In corporate agency, action does not originate in a body
belonging to the corporation to whom the act is attributed,
but in bodies belonging to those human beings whose direct
movements constituted or brought about the act that is then
attributed to the corporation. Consequently, whether
considered as a fictional legal entity or as a real
organization, corporations do not originate acts in the
manner required by attributions of moral responsibility—
namely, by directly moving one’s own body.51
More typically, however, the debate centers on the question of
whether corporations can form intentions, which almost all
advocates of corporate moral responsibility list as a necessary
condition. For example, Michael Keeley responded to French’s
original argument by claiming that corporations cannot be moral
persons because “organizations have no intentions or goals at
all.”52 Keeley contended that although an organization’s CID
structure “may serve to identify organizational behavior, [it does]
50

Id. at 192.
Manuel G. Velasquez, Why Corporations Are Not Morally Responsible
for Anything They Do, 2 BUS. & PROF. ETHICS J. 1, 7 (1983) [hereinafter
Velasquez, Why Corporations].
52
Keeley, supra note 12, at 149.
51
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not ordinarily establish the organizational intent of that behavior or
that it has any real organizational intent at all.”53 Indeed, although
French’s appeal to CID structures can show that corporations can
act “in the sense of producing an effect, it is a large leap to the
claim that it can act in the sense of intending an effect.”54
Similarly, John Ladd argued that as formal organizations,
corporations are capable of only “means-end” rationality.55 He
recognized that given a predetermined goal, corporations can make
empirical judgments about the best means to achieve it, but
contended that corporations have no mechanism by which they can
process or evaluate normative propositions. Consequently,
corporations cannot produce moral intentions—intentions to act
rightly or wrongly in a moral sense. Thus, “for logical reasons, it is
improper to expect organizational conduct to conform to the
ordinary principles of morality,”56 and hence, corporations cannot
be moral agents.57
Other philosophers pressed similar objections. John Danley
accused the advocates of corporate moral responsibility of
equivocating on the meaning of “intention” to stretch it to apply to
corporations,58 arguing that when used in the appropriate sense
“[i]ndividuals within the corporation can intend, lust, have malice,
afterthought, and so forth, but the corporation cannot.”59 In the
same vein, Manuel Velasquez argued that corporations do not
possess the integration of body and mind required for intentional
action because
an act is intentional only if it is the carrying out of an
intention formed in the mind of the agent whose bodily
movements bring about the act . . . . The underlying reason
53

Id. at 151.
Id. at 152.
55
See Ladd, Morality, supra note 12, at 497–98.
56
Id. at 499.
57
Ladd subsequently argued directly against French’s position in John
Ladd, Corporate Mythology and Individual Responsibility, 2 INT’L. J. APPLIED
PHIL. 1 (1984).
58
John R. Danley, Corporate Moral Agency: The Case for Anthropological
Bigotry, in BUSINESS ETHICS: READINGS AND CASES IN CORPORATE MORALITY
202, 204 (W. Michael Hoffman & Jennifer Mills Moore eds., 2d ed. 1990).
59
Id. at 203.
54
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for corporate policies and procedures being unable to
generate intentional action is that the concept of intentional
action . . . is rooted in the concept of an agent with a certain
mental and bodily unity that corporations do not have.60
French responded to such objections by noting that the skeptics
assume that intention requires the presence of human desires and
beliefs, which, indeed, corporations cannot possess.61 French
argued that this is incorrect—that intention requires only the ability
to plan. Plans may flow from desires and beliefs in the case of
individuals, but such desires and beliefs are not necessary for
plans, and therefore are not necessary for intention. He argued that
[to] intend to do something is to plan to do it . . . . My
intention seems to have little to do with my current desires
and beliefs. In fact, desires and beliefs are, at most, only
tangentially involved. My plans and my commitments to
those plans are at the heart of my intentions.62
And because corporations’ CID structures produce corporate plans,
corporations can act intentionally.
Corporate plans might differ from those that motivate the
human persons who occupy corporate positions and whose
bodily movements are necessary for the corporation to act.
Using its CID Structure, however, the concerted behavior
of those humans can be described as corporate actions done
60

Velasquez, Why Corporations, supra note 51, at 8.
Indeed, French concedes that his earlier work embodies the same
assumption, which he now recognizes to be incorrect.
At the base of my earlier view was the widely-held position that
intentionality should be understood in terms of a desire/belief complex.
That position is flawed; indeed, it is downright wrong . . . .
Corporations cannot, in any normal sense, desire and believe. In my
earlier accounts I redescribed desires and beliefs into corporate policy
in order to match the model. Many objected that I had overly
formalized the notions of desire and belief to fit the Corporate Internal
Decision (CID) Structure approach I had created. With them I am now
prepared to say that if intention is no more than desires and beliefs,
then corporations will fail to make it as intentional actors.
Peter A. French, Integrity, Intentions, and Corporations, 34 AM. BUS. L.J. 141,
148–49 (1996).
62
Id. at 148.
61
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with a corporate intention, to execute a corporate plan or as
part of such a plan.63
The change of focus from desires and beliefs to plans did not
convince many of the skeptics that corporations can truly have
intentions. For example, Manuel Velasquez continued to argue that
[t]he problem with French’s claim . . . is that there is
nothing about procedures and policies that can enable them
to transform a metaphorical intention into a real one.
Procedures and policies, however simple or complex,
cannot create group mental states nor group minds in any
literal sense . . . . Human intentions, beliefs, and desires are
mental; that is, they are essentially, by definition, the sort
of things that can be present to, and in, our conscious
minds: the sorts of things that we can be conscious of. This
means that if an organization has such intentions, beliefs,
and desires, it must have a conscious mind, a mind with a
unified consciousness that encompasses within a single
field of awareness all of its nonpathological intentions,
plans, beliefs, and desires . . . The corporation as such does
not have such a unified consciousness.64
Other advocates of corporate moral responsibility have recently
taken up the gauntlet on this question. For example, Denis Arnold
argues that there is no good reason to identify intention with
individual human consciousness as Velasquez does.65 Arnold
argues that intentions may be properly understood as plans or
“commitments to future action,”66 and when they are, there can be
shared intentions. Shared intentions consist in the mutual
intentions of individual parties to engage in a joint activity, the
meshing sub-plans of the intentions, and the common knowledge
of the parties of the first two conditions.67 Arnold then argues that
corporate intentions are the shared intentions of the individuals
who comprise the corporation as integrated by the corporation’s
63

Id. at 152.
Velasquez, Debunking Corporate, supra note 12, at 546–50.
65
Denis G. Arnold, Corporate Moral Agency, 30 MIDWEST STUD. IN PHIL.
279, 284 (2006).
66
Id.
67
See id. at 286.
64
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CID structure.
As with shared intentions, corporate intentions are neither a
set of individual mental states, nor the mental state of some
superagent. Corporate intentions are states of affairs
consisting of both the intersecting attitudes of the class of
agents comprising the corporation and the internal decision
structure of the organization. The CID structure serves as
the frame upon which the attitudes of board members,
executives, managers, and employees are interwoven to
form corporate intentions.68
Hence, corporations can satisfy the intentionality requirement for
corporate moral responsibility.
And so it goes. At the time of this writing, the philosophical
debate about whether corporations can meet the necessary
conditions for moral responsibility is ongoing.69
II. TRANSCENDENTAL NONSENSE
How could there be anything objectionable about this approach
to the question of corporate moral responsibility? What could be
more logical then first identifying the conditions necessary for
moral responsibility and then attempting to determine whether
corporations meet them? What’s wrong with this method of
analysis?
Might I suggest that the problem lies in the nature of the
question the analysis is designed to answer—to wit, whether a
corporation is the type of thing that can bear moral responsibility.
Notice that this question contains an assumption—that a
corporation is a thing. In this respect, the question has the same
character as the notorious query: do you still beat your spouse?
Any attempt to answer it implicitly accepts the embedded
assumption. It is, however, far from obvious that corporations are
things in the sense relevant to the ascription of moral
responsibility. Assuming that they are is precisely the type of
68

Id. at 291.
See, e.g., id. at 279. Indeed, the author has recently reviewed for
publication an article exploring two distinct versions of shared intentionality that
may serve as bases for the attribution of moral responsibility to corporations.
69
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“thingification” of the corporation that Felix Cohen warned us
against 75 years ago.70
The problem with the conventional philosophical arguments
for corporate moral responsibility may have nothing to do with the
absence of any particular characteristic associated with moral
agency, but with the underlying assumption that corporations are
the type of things upon which such characteristics may be
predicated. When considering moral agency, it makes perfect sense
to ask whether an insane person, or a child, or an animal, or a
computer, or an alien can be morally responsible because in each
case there is an actual thing to ask about. Given the existence of a
thing to which it is reasonable to ascribe predicates, one may
intelligibly ask whether that thing has the characteristics necessary
for moral responsibility. But a corporation, like the White House,
Congress, the New York Knicks, and Germany, is not a thing.
These terms are all abstract collective nouns. They refer to
complex networks of (constantly changing) human beings who are
related to each other through certain formal and informal
arrangements. Although there is a sense in which each of these
terms refers to something real, none of them refers to a thing that
has a physical existence in the world. In this context, the White
House does not refer to the physical building within which the
President resides.
Abstract collective nouns are vitally important to our ability to
communicate effectively. They perform a crucial role in
facilitating discourse by allowing us to refer to complex human
arrangements with the convenience of a single term. Hence, we are
perfectly well understood when we say things like the White
House is monitoring the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, Congress
is unable to restrain its profligate spending, and the Knicks play
lousy defense. Similarly, we often speak as though we are
ascribing responsibility to such abstract entities. Thus, we say
things like the White House is morally responsible for the abuse of
detainees in the war on terror, or Congress for the budget deficit, or
Nazi Germany for the Holocaust, or corporations for the
wrongdoing of their employees. There is nothing wrong with
speaking this way as long as we keep in mind that in doing so we
70

Cohen, supra note 1, at 811.
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are speaking metaphorically. We are using a linguistic shorthand
for the unwieldy proposition that some set of difficult to identify
members of an indefinite group of people who are related to each
other in both formal and informal ways have acted so as to produce
morally improper results.
Problems arise, however, when we forget that we are speaking
metaphorically. Once we forget that abstract collective nouns
function merely as linguistic placeholders to facilitate
communication, we begin to think that the abstract collections they
represent are entities that exist in their own right, and to which
properties and characteristics may be ascribed. We are then
tempted to decide questions such as whether the White House is
morally responsible for the abuse of detainees, or Congress for the
budget deficit, or Nazi Germany for the Holocaust, or corporations
for the wrongdoing of their employees by asking whether these
entities can act, or form intentions, or are autonomous, or exhibit
value sensitivity. When we succumb to this temptation, we end up
making ascriptions of moral responsibility purely on the basis of
the relationships among abstract concepts divorced from any
consideration of either the practical consequences or the ethical
appropriateness of the ascriptions. Such behavior is a classic
example of Cohen’s transcendental nonsense.
III. A FUNCTIONAL APPROACH?
Felix Cohen sought to remedy the transcendental nonsense of
his day with what he called “the functional approach.” I have
suggested that the contemporary philosophical debate over the
moral responsibility of corporations consists predominantly of
transcendental nonsense.71 Can this be remedied with a
71

A small number of philosophers have addressed the question in terms of
its practical significance. For example, John Danley argues that ascribing moral
responsibility to corporations is merely “a prelude to many further permissible
or obligatory moves” such as being required to pay compensation or be subject
to punishment, and that any consideration of the question was “incomplete
without incorporating the role it plays in relation to these other moral moves. It
is this which is lacking from the previous discussion of ‘intend.’” John R.
Danley, Corporate Moral Agency: The Case for Anthropological Bigotry, in
BUSINESS ETHICS 202, 205 (W. Michael Hoffman & Jennifer Mills Moore eds.,
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contemporary incarnation of Cohen’s functional approach?
Cohen’s functional approach was designed to analyze and
morally evaluate controversial legal questions on the basis of their
practical effects. Accordingly, Cohen identified two of the
functional approach’s main purposes as “the eradication of
meaningless concepts”72 and “the abatement of meaningless
questions.”73 With regard to the first purpose, Cohen asserted that
“functionalism represents an assault upon all dogmas and devices
that cannot be translated into terms of actual experience.”74 Noting
that “[o]ur legal system is filled with supernatural concepts, that is
to say, concepts which cannot be defined in terms of experience,
and from which all sorts of empirical decisions are supposed to
flow,”75 Cohen declared that “[a]gainst these unverifiable concepts
[the functional approach] presents an ultimatum. Any word that
cannot pay up in the currency of fact, upon demand, is to be
declared bankrupt, and we are to have no further dealings with
it.”76 With regard to the second purpose, Cohen asserted that “[i]t
is a consequence of the functional attack upon unverifiable
concepts that many of the traditional problems of science, law, and
philosophy are revealed as pseudo-problems devoid of meaning.”77
Thus, questions such as “‘Where is a corporation?’ are in fact
meaningless, and can serve only as invitations to equally
2d ed. 1990). Similarly, Manuel Velasquez points out that “the concept of moral
responsibility is conceptually connected to the concepts of blame and
punishment” such that ascribing moral responsibility to a corporation entails
“claiming that there are some people in the corporation who should be blamed
and punished.” Velasquez, Why Corporations, supra note 51, at 10–13. In
addition, Christopher McMahon explicitly considers the practical consequences
of attributing moral personhood to corporations to demonstrate that “there are
moral reasons for denying them the moral status that personhood usually brings
with it.” Christopher McMahon, The Ontological and Moral Status of
Organizations, 5 BUS. ETHICS. Q. 541, 547 (1995). Had the philosophical
community taken more notice of these arguments, the present article would be
unnecessary.
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meaningless displays of conceptual acrobatics.”78
Although Cohen was advocating a functional approach to
jurisprudence, there is no reason why such an approach would not
be equally applicable to philosophical questions such as whether
moral responsibility may be ascribed to corporations. Cohen
himself was aware that “the problem of eliminating supernatural
terms and meaningless questions and redefining concepts and
problems in terms of verifiable realities is not a problem peculiar
to law.”79 If terms such as “Due Process, Police Power, and similar
word-charms of constitutional law”80 are supernatural concepts, it
is reasonable to believe that terms such as “corporate action” and
“corporate intent” may be as well. And if “Where is a
corporation?” is a meaningless question, a good case can be made
that so are questions such as “What does a corporation intend?” or
“Do corporations act autonomously?” or “Are corporations value
sensitive?” Such questions can only be answered by demonstrating
that one abstract concept either can or cannot be predicated onto
another; an activity which, on the basis of the philosophical debate
described in Part I, certainly seems to invite impressive “displays
of conceptual acrobatics.”81
Applying Cohen’s functional approach to the question of the
moral responsibility of corporations would require us to ask what
the practical consequences of ascribing such responsibility to
corporations would be and whether the resulting situation would be
just. Thus, we would begin our inquiry by asking what the point of
holding corporations morally responsible is in the first place—that
is, what difference does assigning moral responsibility to
corporations make in the world? Once this has been determined,
we would then have to evaluate whether we would be ethically
justified in thus altering the state of the world. Interestingly, a
close attention to these questions reveals that ascribing moral
responsibility to corporations is ethically justified only when it is
practically meaningless.
Consider Cohen’s first question. What is the point of holding
78
79
80
81
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Id. at 824.
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corporations morally responsible? What is the practical effect of
doing so? The obvious answer is that doing so authorizes the
infliction of punishment on the corporation as a collective entity.82
If this were not the case, it is not clear why anyone other than
philosophers bent on resolving a difficult semantic issue would
care whether corporations can bear moral responsibility. Unless
assigning moral responsibility to corporations makes them liable to
punishment, there is no practical difference between a world with
corporate moral responsibility and a world without it.
There is, of course, nothing wrong with ascribing moral
responsibility to corporations when doing so does not authorize the
imposition of punishment upon them. In such a case, the ascription
of corporate moral responsibility would merely express a moral
judgment about the institutional arrangements within the
corporation.
It is commonplace today to recognize that corporations have an
ethical culture or “ethos.”83 A corporation’s ethos—which arises
from the combination of the organization’s internal structural
features and the observable behavior of its senior officers and
leaders—affects the conduct of the corporation’s employees.
Corporations with a good corporate ethos tend to encourage ethical
conduct by their employees. Corporations with a poor corporate
ethos, at best, fail to encourage ethical conduct, and at worst,
incentivize irresponsible or dishonest conduct. Thus, a strong
commitment to the maintenance of high ethical standards by senior
corporate leaders, coupled with rewards for employees who live up
to those standards, can significantly decrease the likelihood of
unethical conduct within the firm. In contrast, an organization
whose senior officials are seen to cut ethical corners makes it more
likely that lower-level employees will do so as well. Similarly, a
corporation with a clearly demarcated avenue by which employees
82

It would also authorize the distribution of rewards to corporations. Moral
responsibility implies that one is liable to both moral blame and moral praise.
However, in the present context, the focus is usually on whether corporations
may be held liable for wrongdoing rather than a proper recipient of reward.
Hence, for purposes of concision, I will speak strictly in terms of liability for
wrongdoing in the remainder of this article.
83
See Pamela Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate
Criminal Liability, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1095, 1121–27 (1991).
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can report their ethical concerns will have more ability to prevent
employee wrongdoing than one beset by “organizational blocks,”
such as a strict line of command or diffuse decision-making
authority, that make it more difficult for employees to ensure that
they are behaving properly themselves and to report on the
unethical behavior of others.84
When a poor corporate ethos is a causal factor in producing
unethical action by the firm’s employees, it is natural to assign
blame to the corporation. For example, several commentators cite
Enron’s “rank and yank” compensation system as a significant
element in a corporate ethos that encouraged unethical conduct by
Enron’s traders.85 Under this system, the traders were ranked
against each other on the basis of how much money they brought
in, with the top performers receiving large bonuses and those
ranked in the bottom 10–15 percent being fired. By elevating
financial performance above all other considerations, this
compensation system encouraged the traders to ignore ethical and
legal constraints in pursuit of revenue. Under these circumstances,
it is perfectly intelligible to say that by thus establishing and
maintaining a poor corporate ethos, Enron was morally responsible
for the unethical actions of its traders.
There is nothing objectionable about attributing moral
responsibility to corporations in this sense, as long as one is not
claiming that the corporation is thereby subject to punishment as a
collective entity. But there are also no practical consequences of
doing so. This is simply another example of the semantic
convenience provided by the use of abstract collective nouns.
Saying that corporations are morally responsible for the effects of
their corporate ethos is merely linguistic shorthand for the more
cumbersome statements that the organizational structure of
corporations affects the behavior of its individual employees and
that managers have a moral obligation to maintain an ethical
84

See James A. Waters, Catch 20.5: Corporate Morality as an
Organizational Phenomenon, in CONTEMPORARY MORAL CONTROVERSIES IN
BUSINESS. 160 (A. Pablo Iannone ed., 1989).
85
See, e.g., Geraldine Szott Moohr, Of Bad Apples and Bad Trees:
Considering Fault-based Liability for the Complicit Corporation, 44 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 1343, 1352 (2007); Milton C. Regan, Jr., Moral Intuitions and
Organizational Culture, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 941, 942 (2007).
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corporate culture. Any such assertion of moral responsibility is
fully translatable into assertions about human psychology and the
ethical obligations of individuals. There is no harm in speaking in
this way, but doing so makes no practical difference in the world.
It does not instruct or authorize human beings to behave differently
than they would if the more cumbersome phrasing were employed.
When used in this way, the ascription of moral responsibility to
corporations is ethically unobjectionable, but practically
meaningless.
In contrast, when moral responsibility carries with it liability to
punishment, ascribing moral responsibility to corporations is rife
with practical consequences. The Arthur Andersen accounting firm
survived the individual guilty plea of David Duncan, the leader of
its Enron “engagement team,” on a charge of obstruction of justice,
but was destroyed when indicted for the same offense in its
corporate capacity, resulting in the loss of over 85,000 jobs
worldwide.86 Indeed, it is primarily because of the practical
consequences of being able to inflict punishment on corporations
that the advocates of corporate moral responsibility advance their
position. Such advocates frequently argue that the threat of
corporate punishment can encourage corporations to take steps to
prevent wrongdoing by its agents,87 and that the imposition of
corporate punishment can express public disapproval of any such
wrongdoing that does occur. In addition, imposing punishment on
corporations clearly has a negative impact on the financial
86

See Elizabeth K. Ainslie, Indicting Corporations Revisited: Lessons of
the Arthur Andersen Prosecution, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 107, 109 (2006).
87
It is worth noting that this claim is not obviously correct. In the absence
of corporate moral responsibility, corporations are nevertheless civilly liable for
the wrongs of their employees. Any intentional wrongdoing or reckless conduct
by corporate employees that harm the interests of third parties subjects the
corporation to potentially massive compensatory and punitive damage awards. It
is not obvious that the threat of the relatively small criminal penalties that would
be added if corporations could be held morally responsible as well would add
any noticeable deterrent effect. This article assumes that the threat of corporate
punishment can produce increased efforts at corporate self-policing. This will
certainly be the case with regard to regulatory violations or other infractions that
do not directly harm third parties where the threat of civil liability is not present;
and because of the damaging effect criminal charges can have on a corporation’s
reputation, it may well be the case generally.
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condition of several of the corporation’s stakeholder groups.
Hence, to the extent that the attribution of moral responsibility to
corporations renders them liable to punishment, it has significant
practical consequences.
But this is precisely where the argument for corporate moral
responsibility founders. For under the functional approach, after
identifying the difference assigning moral responsibility to
corporations would make in the world, we must pass on to Cohen’s
second question and ask whether thus changing the world is
ethically justified. And when we do, we find that imposing
punishment on corporate entities is inherently unjust.
In the first place, it is impossible to punish a corporation. At
some point in every academic article on corporate responsibility,
the author trots out the old saw that a corporation has “no soul to
be damned, and no body to be kicked.”88 The present Article has
reached that point. This oft-quoted phrase is merely an ancient
recognition of Cohen’s observation that a corporation is not a
thing. It is impossible to punish a corporation because there is
nothing—no thing—there to absorb the punishment. Any
punishment directed toward a corporation necessarily passes
through its mythical facade to fall on some set of human beings.
Further, any punishment directed toward a corporation is
necessarily financial in nature. Not only can’t corporations be
kicked, they can’t be incarcerated. They may be fined, which
constitutes the direct application of a financial penalty. They may
have licenses revoked or otherwise have their freedom to transact
business restricted, but such measures merely constitute the
indirect application of a financial penalty—they are punitive only
to the extent that they reduce the corporation’s profitability. They
may be liquidated, which can be thought of as a corporate death
sentence. But since corporations are not literally living things, any
“execution” is entirely metaphorical. Liquidation is to be feared
only because of the financial losses that result from it.
Who pays when any such punitive financial loss is imposed
upon a corporation? To the extent that the loss can be passed along
88

See John C. Coffee, No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick: An
Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L.
REV. 386, 386 (1981).
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through increases in the price of the corporation’s products, it is
the consumers who pay. To the extent that the corporation can
assimilate the loss by reducing labor costs, it is the employees who
pay. And to the extent that the corporation is unable to pass along
the loss to either of these groups, it is the owners of the
corporation, the shareholders, who pay.
The characteristic that all of these stakeholder groups share is
that their members are innocent of personal wrongdoing.
Consumers obviously play no role in any wrongdoing by corporate
agents. The employees who lose their jobs due to corporate
retrenchment may have had nothing whatever to do with the
wrongdoing and been completely unaware of it. And given that the
defining characteristic of the modern corporation is the separation
of ownership and control, the shareholders likely had no
knowledge of or control over the behavior of the employees who
engaged in the wrongdoing. Corporate punishment necessarily falls
indiscriminately on the innocent as well as or in place of the guilty.
Corporate punishment is inherently vicarious collective
punishment.
Little argument should be required to establish that such
punishment is unjust. The thing that distinguishes punishment from
the naked infliction of harm is that punishment is deserved.
Punishment is punishment only when it is imposed in response to
some fault on the part of the party being subjected to it. Unless this
is the case, “punishment” is nothing more than coercion. That is
why, on the international level, collective punishment is considered
a human rights violation89 and is banned as a war crime by the
Geneva convention.90 Although the wrong of imposing financial
collective punishment on a corporation’s stakeholders may be an
order of magnitude less severe than that of the war crimes
addressed by the Geneva Convention, the two wrongs are
indistinguishable in principle.
89

See American Convention on Human Rights, art. 5(3) Pact of San José,
July 18, 1978, 1144 UNTS 123 (“Punishment shall not be extended to any
person other than the criminal.”); African Charter on Human and Peoples’
Rights, art. 7, Oct. 21, 1986, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 Rev. 5 (“Punishment is
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A handful of the employees at Arthur Andersen engaged in
conduct that the government believed constituted obstruction of
justice. Each of these employees was subject to indictment,
conviction, and punishment for the offense as an individual. By
indicting the firm for their conduct, the government destroyed the
company; costing 85,000 employees in 390 offices around the
world their jobs.91 Almost all of these employees were personally
innocent of wrongdoing.92 It is difficult to see how assigning moral
responsibility to corporations can be ethically justified if the
practical consequence of doing so is that secretaries in France get
fired for the conduct of executives in Texas.
Enron is the poster child for corporate corruption. If any
corporation could be deserving of punishment, it would have to be
Enron. Yet no effort was ever made to punish Enron as a corporate
entity. Why? The obvious answer is that it would be patently
unjust to impose punishment on Enron’s shareholders who
constituted the bulk of the innocent victims of the crimes
committed by Enron’s employees.
Advocates of corporate moral responsibility frequently argue
that the ability to visit punishment on corporations as collective
entities can deter wrongdoing. Fear of corporate punishment can
motivate managers to institute compliance programs and make
efforts to maintain a good corporate ethos that can reduce
wrongdoing by employees. I have no doubt that this is correct. The
threat of collective punishment is indeed an effective way to
motivate people to suppress undesirable conduct by others. That is
almost always its purpose. Collective punishment can deter. The
problem is not that collective punishment is not effective. It’s that
it is not just.
Deterrence can be a legitimate purpose of punishment. There is
nothing ethically objectionable about imposing punishment on a
wrongdoer to discourage others from behaving in a similar way.
By associating punishment with transgression, we hope to cause
91

See Ainslie, supra note 86, at 109.
In fact, all of Andersen’s employees were innocent of criminal
wrongdoing because the Supreme Court overturned Andersen’s conviction on
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others to refrain from transgressing for fear of a similar sanction.
But this form of deterrence is distinct in kind from the form that
consists of threatening to punish those who are innocent of
wrongdoing to pressure them into suppressing the undesirable
conduct of their fellow citizens.
The world would be a better place if we could more effectively
deter crimes committed by teenagers. And we undoubtedly could
do so by threatening to punish the teenagers’ parents for their
children’s offenses. We do not do so because we recognize that
such punishment is no different in principle from the more venal
and obviously unacceptable practice of the Nazis, who sought to
deter acts of resistance by punishing innocent members of the
communities in which such acts occurred. Threatening the
innocent stakeholders of a corporation with punishment for the
wrongdoing of culpable employees in order to force corporate
managers to engage in more intensive self-policing is not ethically
distinct from threatening to punish the innocent members of a
family or a community for the wrongdoing of their relatives or
fellow community members.
Advocates of corporate moral responsibility also frequently
argue that inflicting punishment on corporations can be a useful
means of expressing society’s disapproval of the conduct
committed by its employees in its name, and thus serves the
“expressive function of punishment.”93 As with the claim
regarding deterrence, I do not doubt that this is true. But my
objection remains the same. Although it may be an effective way
of expressing disapproval, it is not a just way of doing so.
An essential characteristic of punishment that distinguishes it
from other penalties may indeed be that “punishment is a
conventional device for the expression of attitudes of resentment
and indignation, and of judgments of disapproval and reprobation,
on the part either of the punishing authority himself or of those ‘in
whose name’ the punishment is inflicted.”94 There is nothing
ethically objectionable about visiting punishment on a wrongdoer
in order to express disapproval of his or her conduct. But this is
93
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different in kind from punishing those who are innocent of
wrongdoing in order to express resentment and indignation toward
the conduct of others with whom they are somehow associated.
History repeatedly teaches the evil of punishing on the basis of
guilt by association. The investigations of the House Un-American
Activities Committee and the blacklist of the 1950s illustrate the
injustice of condemning people because they are associated with
others who may be engaged in unacceptable conduct. Riots
directed against African-American communities in the segregated
South were extraordinarily effective means of expressing the larger
community’s condemnation of the crimes committed by the
individual members of those communities. Collective punishment
is undoubtedly an effective means of expressing society’s
condemnation of individual wrongdoing. But it is not a just one.
Corporate punishment is vicarious collective punishment.
Collective punishment is inherently unjust. Hence, to the extent
that assigning moral responsibility to corporations authorizes
corporate punishment, corporate moral responsibility is unjust.
And it cannot be redeemed by demonstrating that it is effective at
increasing corporate self-policing or at denouncing wrongdoing.
For collective punishment involves punishing the innocent to attain
a desired societal end, and as such is incompatible with the Kantian
insight that lies at the heart of any liberal society—that individuals
may not be used merely as means to the ends of others or of
society as a whole. When the practical significance of corporate
moral responsibility is to pass the harm associated with corporate
punishment through to the corporation’s stakeholders whether they
deserve it or not, corporate moral responsibility is ethically
pernicious and must be eschewed.
CONCLUSION
In 1935, Felix Cohen pointed out the absurdity of attempting to
determine the state in which a corporation was subject to lawsuit
by answering the abstract, empirically meaningless question:
Where is a corporation? Seventy-five years later, philosophers are
attempting to determine whether corporations should be subject to
punishment as collective entities by answering abstract,
empirically meaningless questions such as: Do corporations act

Where Is Felix Cohen When We Need Him?

81

autonomously or have intentions or demonstrate value sensitivity?
Although these may be fascinating philosophical questions, their
answers require no consideration of either the practical
consequences of imposing punishment on corporations or the
ethical acceptability of doing so. By thus attempting to derive an
empirically significant conclusion purely from the examination of
the relationships among abstract concepts, the contemporary
philosophical debate over corporate moral responsibility
constitutes a 21st century example of Cohen’s transcendental
nonsense.
In this Article, I have suggested that the proper response to
questions about the intentions, autonomy, or value sensitivity of
corporations is: Who cares? Looked at in terms of its practical
significance, the attribution of moral responsibility to corporations
allows for only two possibilities. Corporate moral responsibility
either authorizes corporate punishment or it does not.
If it does not, then corporate moral responsibility is merely a
linguistically useful device for directing attention to the
psychological effects an organization’s structure can have on the
behavior of the individuals who comprise it and the corresponding
obligation of corporate managers to attempt to maintain a positive
corporate ethos. In this case, corporate moral responsibility is
ethically unobjectionable, but practically meaningless.
However, if corporate moral responsibility does authorize
corporate punishment, then it authorizes a form of vicarious
collective punishment that inflicts evil on those who are personally
innocent of wrongdoing in order to achieve a desired societal goal.
In this case, corporate moral responsibility has great practical
significance, but is ethically pernicious. For no matter how worthy
the societal goal, fundamental ethical principles place some means
of achieving them, such as punishing the innocent, off limits.
We fail to recognize this only because our ability to see a
“thing” that is not there—the corporation—obscures our vision of
the things that are there—individual human beings each of whom
possesses a fundamental moral entitlement not to be used merely
as means to the ends of others. This is the danger of the
“thingification” of abstract concepts that Felix Cohen warned us
about seventy-five years ago. It is also the reason that the most
important question among those that have been examined in this
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Article is the one contained in its title.

